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We develop a theoretical model of foreign aid to analyse a method of disbursement of 
aid which induces the recipient government to follow a more pro-poor policy than it 
otherwise would do. In our two-period model, aid is given in the second period and the 
volume of it depends on the level of wellbeing of the target group in the first period. We 
find that this way of designing aid does increase the welfare of the poor. We also 
consider the situations where the donor and the recipient governments act 
simultaneously as well as sequentially, and find that by moving first in a sequential 
game, the donor country can, under certain conditions, increase the welfare of the poor 
and its own compared to the case of simultaneous moves. 
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 1 Introduction
The basic purpose of foreign aid is to assist countries in promoting economic development
including improving the wellbeing of the poor. Although foreign aid in the form of Marshall
Aid after World War II was hugely successful in promoting economic development in the
war-torn Europe, its eect in the developing world in the last forty years or so has been
questionable (see, for example, Mosley et al., 1987; Boon, 1996). In the literature there
are many explanations for the latter, i.e., the ineectiveness of aid. For example, it has
been said that aid promotes rent seeking behavior in the recipient countries (Svensson, 2000;
Alesina and Weder, 2002; Easterly, 2003). Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Collier and Dollar
(2002) suggested that aid is eective only in countries with good policies implying that the
ineectiveness of aid is primarily due to bad policies followed by the recipient governments.1
In Dalgaard et al. (2004) geography seems to matter in the eectiveness of aid. Mavrotas
(2005) considers aid heterogeneity and nds variations in aid eectiveness according to the
type of aid.2
Conditional aid can in principle discipline the recipient government, and conditionality
can include policy changes. Adam and O'Connell (1999) and Lahiri and Raimondos-Mller
(1997a) examine the eects of aid that is tied to the reduction of distortionary taxes. Lahiri
and Raimondos-Mller (1997) and Svensson (2003) suggest that conditional or unconditional
aid can be made more eective if recipient countries compete for aid.
There are however two broad arguments against aid conditionalities that are found
in the literature and in policy discussions. First of all, some say recipient countries should
be allowed to follow their own economic policies. In recent years the British government
withheld their contributions to the World Bank budget as they thought that the World
Bank was unnecessarily interfering with sovereign countries in economic policy making. The
British position was not simply a issue of a principle. In fact, Devrajan et al. (2001)
1conducted case studies for ten African countries and found that conditional aid hampered
the recipient countries from pursuing better policies as they lost exibility and became
passive since donor countries dictated their policies.
The second criticism stems from the fact that often donor countries do not seem to
have much control on how the recipients use aid. There are many empirical studies which
suggest that for all intents and purposes foreign aid is fungible: see, for example, Pack
and Pack (1993), Khilji and Zampelli, (1994), Boone (1996), Feyzioglu et al. (1998), and
Swaroop et al. (2000). Thus, conditionalities may not work. In fact, many donor countries
and multilateral institutions have tried giving aid on a selective basis with conditions such
as good policies, but aid-eectiveness remains as illusive as ever (see, for example, Santiso,
2001). Thus, we have situations where some well-meaning recipient countries are not allowed
to follow good policies because of donor-imposed conditionalities, and we have situations
where `bad' recipient governments get away with following inappropriate polices.
As Devrajan et al. (2001) point out that there have been cases where the disbursement
of aid has been designed in a way that conditionalities were unnecessary. One such example
is the policy of progressive aid giving in which very little aid was given in pre-reform period
but the volume of aid rose when policies improved. Ghana and Uganda are examples of this
success story. On the contrary, in case of Zambia, large amounts of conditional aid could
not improve policies but worsened it.
The above discussions suggest the need for innovations in the way aid is disbursed.
In this paper we propose one particular way of doing so, and this puts no conditionality on
the recipient.3 We develop a two-period model with two groups of people in the recipient
country. Aid is meant for one of the groups (the target group), but due to corruption a
proportion of aid may nd its way to the non-target group. In our proposed design, aid is
given in period 2 but the amount of aid is dependent on the level of wellbeing of the target
group in period 1. The recipient government can aect the wellbeing of the target group in
2period 1 by the use of scal policy. In this sense, aid can be viewed as a prize to the recipient
government for reducing poverty through scal policy.4
We consider two scenarios. In the rst, the donor and the recipient act simultaneously.
In the second scenario, the donor country can credibly commit on its aid policy in the sense
that it moves rst in a sequential decision making.
The paper is organized in the following manner. The model is described in section
2. In section 3 the case of passive donor, the amount if aid is xed, is analyzed. Section 4
discusses a situation where the donor is active. This section is divided into two subsections.
In subsection 4.1 decision-making by the donor and that by the recipient are simultaneous.
Sequential decision making where the donor acts as a leader is described in subsection 4.2.
Concluding remarks are presented in section 5.
2 Aid as Prize: a Formal Model
In our model we consider two countries; the donor and the recipient. In the recipient country
there are two groups of people, rich and poor, labeled as r and p, respectively.5 The size of
population for the rich is same in both the periods, L
r
and for poor it is, L
p
1 in period 1 and
L
p
2 in period 2.
The citizens of the donor country are altruistic and hence derive some utility by
helping the poor in the recipient country. At the beginning of period 1 the donor country




1) is the utility
level of the poor in period 1, and  is a policy parameter for the donor.
In period 1, the recipient government levies a lump-sum tax on the rich and transfers it
to the poor.6 In period 2, a proportion of foreign aid is transfered to the poor, the remaining
goes to the rich.
3The production side of the recipient economy in the two periods are represented by




;K + I), where K is the capital stock in period
1 and I is the level of investment in period 1 which add to the capital stock in period 2.7
On the consumption side, the inter-temporal expenditure of a rich person is given
by the expenditure function Er(P1;P2;ur) where ur is its inter-temporal utility level and
 = 1=(1 + i) where i is the exogenous interest rate at which a rich person can borrow as
much as it wants in period 1, and Pi (i = 1;2) is the vector of prices in period i. We take the
recipient country to be a small open economy so that P1 and P2 are exogenously given. The
poor are assumed not be able to borrow at all. Each poor persons expenditure function in




2) respectively where u
p
2 is the utility
level of a poor person in period 2.8
Assuming, for simplicity, that the rental on capital accrues completely to the rich and
wage income goes exclusively to the poor, the income-expenditure balance equations in the
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K = 1: (4)
The left hand side of (1) is the total discounted expenditure (consumption and in-
vestment) by the rich. The rst and the second terms on the right hand side of (1) are
respectively rental income from capital in period 1 and the discounted rental income in pe-
riod 2. The third term is the discounted value of the part of foreign aid in period 2 that
is given to the rich, and nally last term is the lump-sum tax that is taken away from the
rich in period 1. Equations (2) and (3) are the income-expenditure balance equations for
the poor in periods 1 and 2 respectively. The rst term is the factor (wage) income and the
4second term is the transfer income. T is the lump-sum transfer from the rich to the poor in
period 1, and u
p
1 is the proportion of aid in period 2 that is given to the poor. Equation
(4) represents the optimality of investment I. It is obtained by setting @ur=@I = 0.
Having described the overall scenario above, we now discuss the behavior of the
recipient and the donor governments. In the following section, we shall assume that the
donor is passive in the sense that the parameter  is exogenous. In section 4, we endogenize
this parameter by considering an active donor.
3 Passive Donor
In this section we shall take  to be exogenous and consider the recipient governments
decision making on the two instruments at its disposal, viz., the lump-sum tax T and the
allocation parameter 
















where  > 1; is the extra weight placed on the welfare of the rich by the recipient government.
That is, the government cares for welfare of the rich more than that they do for the poor.
This is often called a political support function (see, for example, Van Long and Vousden
(1991)). This formulation can have many interpretations including a situation where the rich
lobbies the government with the help of campaign contributions a la Grossman and Helpman
(1994). p is the rate of time preference for the poor. This formulation of the government's
objective function is somewhat similar to Lahiri and Raimondos-Mller (2004) who analyzed
the issue of fungibility of aid in a single-period model and how the donor government can
aect it.
In the above framework, when the recipient decides on the lump-sum tax, it is aware
5of the penalties that the donor country can impose by lowering the amount of aid which
would adversely aect both the rich and the poor.
Before deriving the optimality conditions, it is useful to dierentiate equations (1)-(3)
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Using equations (6)-(8), the rst order condition for the optimizing problem of the













































An increase in  for a given level of T, increases the utility of the poor in period 2.
This is the marginal benet of increasing . However, an increase in  reduces the income
of the rich in period 2 This is the marginal cost of increasing . Equation (9) equates the
marginal benets and marginal costs. Similarly, an increase in T reduces (increases) the
income of the rich (poor) in period 1 and increases the income of both the rich and and the
poor in period 2 by increasing the volume of aid. In equation (10) optimal T is determined
at a point where the marginal cost is equal to the marginal benet of increasing T. Note
that whereas equation (9) gives a relationship between the marginal utilities of income of
the rich and that of the poor in period 2, equation (10) provides a relationship between the
marginal utilities of income of the rich and that of the poor in periods 1 and 2.9
Having derived the optimality conditions, we shall now examine the eects of changes






















































































The signs of G and GT are in general ambiguous since an increase in  has conict-
ing eects on the marginal benets and marginal costs of  and T. For example, an increase
in , ceteris paribus, increases incomes of both the rich and the poor in the second period
by raising the volume of aid. This reduces the marginal utilities of income of both groups,
and thus reduces both the marginal cost and the marginal benet of increasing .
Dening r = Er
uuur=Er








u , and making the
reasonable assumption that the preferences of the poor are same in both the periods | i.e.,







































































































































































7where  (= pEp1
u =Ep2
u ) is the implicit discount factor | one over one plus the implict
interest rate | for the poor (see Djaji c et al. (1999)). Since the implicit interest rate faced
by the poor is likely to be much larger than that faced by the rich, we make the natural
assumption that   .10







That is, an increase in  increases the optimal level of T, but reduces that of . Formally,
Proposition 1 A stronger linkage between the volume of aid in period 2 and the level of
welfare of the poor in period 1 leads to a higher transfer of income to the poor in period 1
and a bigger share of aid going to the poor in period 2.
Intuitively, a stronger linkage between the volume of aid in period 2 and the level of
welfare of the poor in period 1 acts as a carrot for the recipient government in period 1: it
raises the level of rich-to-poor transfer in order to receive a higher volume of aid in period 2.
However, having received a higher volume of aid, it then compensates the rich for extracting
from it a higher level of transfer in period 1 by giving the latter a higher proportion of the
aid received. We now analyze how an increase in  aects the welfare of the poor.
An increase in , by increasing the amount of rich-to-poor transfer T in period 1,
unambiguously increases the welfare of the poor in period 1. However, it has conicting
eect on the welfare of the poor in period 2. First, since the total amount of aid u
p
1
increases with , the income of the poor in period 2 increases for a given value of . But
since  decreases with , an increase in  reduces the income of the poor in period 2, for a













































































































That is, an increase in  unambiguously increases the inter-temporal utility of the poor.
Formally,
Proposition 2 A stronger linkage between the volume of aid in period 2 and the level of
welfare of the poor in period 1 unambiguously increases period-1 utility and inter-temporal
utility of the poor. It also increases period-2 utility of the poor if and only if p1 > .
The possibility that an increase in  can in fact increase period-two utility is an
interesting one, as in our two-period model, the recipient government has no direct incentive
to be particularly kind to the poor in period 2. This happens partly via an increase in the
total amount of aid. Note that when  is suciently high or, in other words, the implicit
interest rate for the poor is suciently low, the poor's welfare in period 2 will in fact increase
with . This is because a lower value of the interest in some sense would allow the poor to
eectively transfer some of the benets from period 1 to period 2.
94 Active Donor
In this section we endogenize the parameter  by assuming that the donor government chooses
it optimally. We consider two situations based on the timing of the decision making process
of the donor and the recipient. In the rst case we will consider the case of simultaneous
decision making, i.e., where both the governments act at the same time. This is done in
subsection 4.1. In subsection 4.2, we will analyze a sequential decision making game where
the donor moves rst and recipient acts as a follower. Later, the two equilibria will be
compared.
4.1 Simultaneous Decisions
The donor and the recipient move at the same time taking each ones actions as given, i.e.
the recipient chooses  and T considering  as a constant and donor chooses  taking  and
T as given.
The optimality conditions for the recipient country are the same as in (9) and (10).


























where V (:) is the indirect utility function (with V 0 > 0 and V 00 < 0),  is the discount rate in
the donor country,  is the altruism parameter, and the expression inside the square brackets
is the total discounted welfare of the poor people in the recipient country.

























10An increase in  increases aid and therefore reduces income in the donor country. This
is the marginal cost of increasing , and is given by the right hand side of (18). However,
providing aid increases welfare of the poor in the recipient country this increases the utility
of the donor country via the altruism factor. This eect is captured by the left hand side of
(18).
Equations (9), (10) and (18) simultaneously determine the optimal values of , T and
. Having described the simultaneous game, we shall now carry out a few comparative static
exercises. For simplicity, for these exercises we shall rst treat T as exogenous so that we
shall only consider equations (9) and (18). Having done this, we shall then consider T to be
endogenous and  as exogenous, focusing on equations (10) and (18).
Case 1: Exogenous T
We start by considering a comparative static eect of the corruption parameter .























































Note that the second order condition for the donor's optimization problem requires that
UD







It follows from the above that an increase  unambiguously reduces the allocation
of aid to the poor. This is because an increase in the corruption parameter increases the
marginal cost of increasing  (the rst term in (9)). The eect of an increase in  on 
is however ambiguous. This is because an increase in  on one hand reduces the marginal
11benet of increasing  by reducing . On the other hand, the induced reduction in  reduces
the second-period income of the poor and thus increases the marginal utility of income in
that period. This increases the marginal benet of increasing . The net eect on  is







2) is less than the share of aid in
period 2 income of the poor, when the magnitude of p2 is less than unity then an increase
in  will decrease .
Proposition 3 When the donor and the recipient countries move simultaneously, an in-
crease in corruption in the recipient country, unambiguously reduces the proportion of aid
going to the poor. In such a situation, the donor will reduce  provided p2 is not very large.
Turning to the comparative static eects of the altruism parameter,, and the income

















































and G is dened in (13).
An increase in income in the donor country reduces the marginal cost of increasing
 (and thus increasing aid) by reducing the marginal utility of income there (see (18). This
increases the optimal value of . An increase in  also increases the optimal value of 
by increasing the marginal benet of increasing . This increase in the optimal value of 
(because of an increase in either Y or ) has two opposite eects on the optimal level of .
First, it reduces the marginal utility of the rich and therefore the marginal cost of increasing
. Second, it also reduces the marginal utility of the poor in period 2 and therefore the
12marginal benet of increasing . If the poor have very low time preferences, i.e. pis very
low then the rst eect will dominate and the optimal value of  will increase with both Y
and . Formally,
Proposition 4 Suppose that the donor and the recipient country move simultaneously. Then
an increase in altruism or income in the donor country unambiguously induces the donor
government to impose a stronger relationship between the volume of aid and the wellbeing of
the poor in period 1. This induced stronger relationship increases the optimal value of the
proportion of aid going to the poor if the time preference of the poor is suciently low.
Case 2: Exogenous 
Now we will consider  to be exogenous and examine comparative static eects on T









































































An increase in corruption in the recipient country will increase the marginal cost of
increasing T, and thus the optimal value of T will fall. However, in this case the eect of
an increase in  on  is unambiguously positive. An increase in corruption, by reducing
T, lowers the volume of aid. This increases the marginal utility of income for the poor in
13period 2 (which in turn increases the marginal benet of increasing ), but it also reduces
the marginal utility of income in the donor country (which in turn reduces the marginal cost
of increasing ). These two eects reinforce each other and the optimal value of  increases
with . This result is formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 When donor and recipient move simultaneously, then an increase in cor-
ruption in the recipient country will reduce the level of rich-to-poor transfer in period 1 and
donor will strengthen link between aid and the wellbeing of the poor in period 1.
As for the comparative static eects of the donor's income and the altruism parameter


































































































Any increase in the altruism parameter (or, income in the donor country) will increase
the marginal benet of increasing  ((or, reduce the marginal cost of increasing  by reducing
the marginal utility of income in the donor country). Thus the eects on  are unambiguously
positive. This induced increase in the value of  has conicting eects on the marginal eects
of T. However, if the rate of time preference for the poor is suciently low, the optimal level
of T will increase. Formally,
14Proposition 6 If the donor and recipient move simultaneously then an increase in the al-
truism parameter or the income of the donor will increase . This will induce the recipient
to increase T if the the time preference of the poor is not very high.
4.2 Sequential Decisions
Having analyzed the case where both countries act simultaneously, in this section we shall
examine if credible commitment on the part of the donor country can inuence the equilib-
rium by inducing the recipient government to follow a more pro-poor policy. To be more
specic, in this section we assume that the donor country acts as a leader and the recipient
country as the follower. In order to achieve a sub-game perfect equilibrium, we work with
backward induction, starting with stage two of the game. In stage two of the game, the
recipient country optimally chooses the values of  and T for a given value of . The recipi-
ent's reaction functions () and T() are derived from (9) and (10). Hence in the stage I of
the game the donor country optimally chooses its instruments by taking into consideration
the recipient's reaction functions, () and T(). That is, the donor government maximizes
(17) subject to (9) and (10) (the recipient's reaction functions).

































The last two terms were absent in the simultaneous game and appear here because of
the sequential nature of the present game. From Proposition 1, dT=d > 0 and d=d < 0.
Hence, since the sum of the rst two terms on the right hand side of (19) is zero when it is























15where sim is the equilibrium value of  in the simultaneous game. If the time preference
of the poor is suciently low, then the positive eect of T will dominate and seq > sim
where seq is the equilibrium value of  in the sequential game. A higher  in the sequential
game also implies a higher value of T and lower value of  in that game (compared to the
simultaneous game). However, this will mean a higher welfare for the poor and the donor
country. This result is formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 7 The welfare of the poor and the donor will be higher in a sequential game
where the donor moves rst as compared to a simultaneous game, provided the the rate of
time preference for the poor is suciently low.
By committing credibly to a stronger relationship between aid in period 2 and good
governance in period 1 (in the sense of a better pro-poor policy in period 1), the donor
country is able to induce the recipient country to follow a more pro-poor policy as compared
to the situation where prior commitment is not possible.
5 Conclusion
Foreign aid is often given for the benet of the poor in a recipient country. However, more
often than not, a signicant proportion of this aid is diverted away from the target group.
In the literature this is known as fungibility of foreign aid. Fungibility is often blamed for
the ineectiveness of aid which in turn causes aid fatigue among donors.
In this paper we have tried to develop a method of disbursement of aid that would
induce recipient countries to follow, without any conditionality on the use of aid, a more
pro-poor policies than they would otherwise do. Our method would also imply a higher ow
of aid than there would be in its absence.
16The method involves linking the volume of aid in a period to the wellbeing of the
target group in the previous period. The recipient country is assumed to maximize its
political support function (which attached a higher weight to the welfare of the non-target
group than to that of the target group) by optimally choosing a level of transfer from the
rich to the poor in the rst period and the allocation aid between the two groups in the
second period.
We analyze the donor's and the recipient's behavior under three scenarios : (1) the
donor is passive in the sense that its policy instrument (the link between aid and pro-poor
policy) is treated as exogenous, (2) the donor is active and chooses it policy at the same as
the recipient government chooses its instruments, (3) the donor behaves as a leader.
When the donor is passive, an increase in the aid determining parameter of the donor,
or the link between aid in the second period and good governance (a more pro-poor policy)
in the rst period, raises the level of transfer from the rich to the poor, but lowers the poor's
share in aid. However, the total welfare of the poor increases.
When the donor is active and chooses the aid determining parameter simultaneously
as the recipient government chooses its instruments, the deterioration of governance in the
recipient country in the sense of a higher weight for the non-target group in the recipient
country's objective function, leads to lower proportion of aid going to the poor and lower
transfer from the rich to the poor. However, an increase in either altruism or income in the
donor country increases the aid determining parameter.
We compare the equilibrium between the cases when the two countries act simultane-
ously and when the donor acts before the recipient country in a sequential-move game. We
nd that the volume of aid is higher and the recipient government follows a more pro-poor
policy in the sequential game as compared to the simultaneous game, provided the rate of
time preference for the poor is suciently low.
17Our simple theoretical study points out that the mode of disbursement of aid in a
dynamic context can be a move forward for the benet of all the parties concerned.
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Notes
1Hansen and Tarp (2001) and Easterly (2003) show that the Burnside-Collier-Dollar results are very
sensitive to model specications and sample selection. Hansen and Tarp (2001) also nd that aid is eective
without any qualication.
2See also various articles in Lahiri (2007) for all the issues involved in aid eectiveness.
3Collier and Dollar (2002) propose an aid allocation rule that is likely to have signicant impact on
poverty reduction under limited information on the part of the donors.
4As Collier and Dollar (2004) note poverty reduction is the central goal of most aid programs.
5This classication is for convenience only. There can be other classications based on ethnicity or caste,
for example.
6For simplicity we use this simple policy instrument. One can consider a more complicated way of
transferring income from the rich to the poor; for example through the provision of public good such as
health and education services.
217Since prices do not vary in our analysis, for brevity, these are left out of the arguments of the revenue
function. See Dixit and Norman (1980) for properties of revenue function. It is well known that the partial
derivative of the revenue function with respect to the ith endowment gives the supply function for the ith
good.
8For properties of the expenditure function see Dixit and Norman (1980). It is well known that Epi
u is
the reciprocal of the marginal utility of income for the poor in period i.




























































































































10Note that in our model the poor are assumed not to be able to borrow at all. Thus, they do not actually
face any interest rate;  is the implicit discount factor facing the poor.
11This expression is obtained by substituting the expressions of d=d and dT=d obtained earlier and
using the fact that du
p
1=d = 0 (equation(7)).
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